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Autoscopic phenomena (AP) are rare illusory visual experiences during which the subject has the impression of seeing a second own body
in extrapersonal space. AP consist of out-of-body experience (OBE), autoscopic hallucination (AH), and heautoscopy (HAS). The present
article reviews and statistically analyzes phenomenological, functional, and anatomical variables in AP of neurological origin (n = 41
patients) that have been described over the last 100 years. This was carried out in order to further our understanding of the underlying
mechanisms of AP, much as previous research into the neural bases of body part illusions has demystified these latter phenomena. Several
variables could be extracted, which distinguish between or are comparable for the three AP providing testable hypotheses for subsequent
research. Importantly, we believe that the scientific demystification of AP may be useful for the investigation of the cognitive functions and
brain regions that mediate processing of the corporeal awareness and self consciousness under normal conditions.
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The self is experienced as distinct from other human
conspecifics and may be described as an enduring entity (i.e.
the feeling that we are the same person across time) to which
certain mental events and actions are ascribed (i.e. the
feeling that we are the authors of our thoughts and actions)
and which is distinct from the environment [58]. The self has
fascinated mankind from time immemorial [94] and its many
concepts have been influenced by theology, philosophy,
psychology [43,75,77], but also by clinical observations
from neurology and psychiatry [41,58,73,74,50,89,90,93].
More recently, cognitive neuroscience has started elucidat-
ing some of the cognitive and neural mechanisms of isolatedaspects of self processing such as agency [25,37,38],
ownership [43], perspective taking [36,85,99], self-other
distinction [25,37,38,85–87], and spatial unity between self
and body [12]. Yet, as argued by Kircher and Davis [58] the
neuroscientific study of the self is in its infancy, as there are
currently no established models, very little data, and often
not even the vocabulary to describe neuroscientific notions
of the self. In addition, with respect to clinical investiga-
tions, most studies investigate abnormal self processing in
psychiatric conditions such as schizophrenia [42,58],
whereas abnormal self processing in neurological conditions
has received less attention.
The present article reviews neurological data about
complex experiences that are characterized by the visual
O. Blanke, C. Mohr / Brain Research Reviews 50 (2005) 184–199186illusory reduplification of the patient’s own body. These
phenomena are called autoscopic phenomena (AP) and are
generally classified among disorders of somatognosia.
Visual disorders of somatognosia include a variety of
usually short lasting, illusory experiences about the seen
and felt location and position of one’s body or body parts
in space [11,19,62,63,73,90]. They generally occur in
patients with posterior brain damage and are characterized
by illusions that only affect a certain body part (visual
body-part illusions) or affect the entire body (visual body
illusions or autoscopic phenomena [AP]). A variety of
visual and non-visual body part illusions such as dis-
connection, dislocation, movement, and reduplification of,
for example, an arm have been described [19,22,50,66,84].
This increased interest in visual body part illusions and
especially non-visual body part illusions such as phantom
limbs [48,84] led to their neuroscientific investigation and
the description of many of their underlying neurocognitive
mechanisms. Much less is known about AP, i.e., visual
body illusions that affect the entire body. Their scientific
study continues to occupy a position between neurobiology
and mysticism. Moreover, given the rarity of AP, the
widespread neurological literature, and the complex phe-
nomenology of AP they have only recently been classified
systematically. The present review analyzes phenomeno-
logical, functional, and anatomical similarities and differ-
ences of the three main forms of AP: out-of-body
experience (OBE), autoscopic hallucination (AH), and
heautoscopy (HAS). The separation in three distinct AP
was initially developed by Devinsky et al. [32] and
subsequently extended by Gru¨sser and Landis [47],
Brugger et al. [18,22], and Blanke et al. [11]. These
authors agreed that the combined classification of the well-
known phenomenon OBE with the less known phenomena
AH and HAS is important since during all three AP the
subject has the impression of seeing a second own body in
extrapersonal space. It has been speculated that these
phenomenological characteristics point to similar as well as
distinct neurocognitive mechanisms in the different forms
of AP [22,11]. In addition, three other phenomena have
previously been classified as AP: internal heautoscopy
[50,62,73,93], negative heautoscopy [50,62,73,93], and the
feeling of a presence (for recent reviews see [47,22]).
During internal heautoscopy, subjects report seeing one or
several of their inner organs. During negative heautoscopy,
subjects report not seeing their reflection in a reflecting
surface. The feeling of a presence is defined as the convincing
feeling that there is another person close by without actually
seeing that person [21,10] and has been called previously
‘‘leibhafte Bewusstheit’’ [56], ‘‘hallucination du compagnon’’
[62] or ‘‘feeling of a presence’’ [21,10]). We have not
included internal and negative heautoscopy in the present
analysis because they are extremely rare and there have been,
to our knowledge, no reported cases due to focal brain
damage. Although several patients with the feeling of a
presence due to focal brain damage have been described (forreview see [21]), we have not included the feeling of a
presence in the present analysis because it is characterized by
a non-visual body reduplification as opposed to the three
main forms of APwhich are all characterized by a visual body
reduplification (see below; for alternative classifications of
AP see [22,47,50,62,73,93]).
The present review was carried out in order to better
understand the underlying mechanisms of AP, much as
previous research into the neural bases of visual body part
illusions has demystified these latter phenomena [48,84]. In
addition, we believe that the scientific demystification of
AP may be useful in defining functions and brain structures
that mediate processes of corporeal awareness and self
consciousness [75].2. Autoscopic phenomena
2.1. Classification
OBE: During an OBE people seem to be awake and feel
that their ‘‘self’’, or center of awareness, is located outside of
the physical body and somewhat elevated. It is from this
elevated extrapersonal location that the subjects experience
seeing their body and the world [4,11,18,32,54]. The
subject’s reported perceptions are organized in such a way
as to be consistent with this elevated visuo-spatial perspec-
tive. The following example from Lunn [66, #1] illustrates
what individuals commonly experience during an OBE:
‘‘Suddenly it was as if he saw himself in the bed in front of
him. He felt as if he were at the other end of the room, as if
he were floating in space below the ceiling in the corner
facing the bed from where he could observe his own body in
the bed. [. . .] he saw his own completely immobile body in
the bed; the eyes were closed.’’
An OBE can thus be defined as the presence of the
following three phenomenological elements: the feeling of
being outside one’s physical body (or disembodiment); the
presence of a distanced and elevated visuo-spatial perspec-
tive (or perspective); and the seeing of one’s own body (or
autoscopy) from this elevated perspective. These three
aspects are shown graphically in Fig. 1.
AH: During an AH people experience seeing a double of
themselves in extrapersonal space without the experience of
leaving one’s body (no disembodiment). As compared to
OBEs, individuals with AH experience to see the world
from their habitual visuo-spatial perspective and experience
their ‘‘self’’, or center of awareness inside their physical
body (Fig. 1). The following example of an AH is taken
from Ko¨lmel [59, #6].
‘‘ [. . .] the patient suddenly noticed a seated figure on the
left. ‘‘It wasn’t hard to realize that it was I myself who was
sitting there. I looked younger and fresher than I do now.
My double smiled at me in a friendly way.’’
Fig. 1. Phenomenology of autoscopic phenomena. In this figure the phenomenology of AH (left), HAS (middle) and OBE (right) is represented schematically.
The experienced position and posture of the physical body for each autoscopic phenomenon is indicated by black lines and the experienced position and
posture of the disembodied body (OBE) or autoscopic body (AH, HAS) in dashed lines. The finding that AH and HAS were mainly reported from a sitting/
standing position and OBE in a supine position is integrated into the figure. The experienced visuo-spatial perspective during the autoscopic phenomenon is
indicated by the arrow pointing away from the location in space from which the patient has the impression to see from (AH: from the physical body; OBE: from
a disembodied body or location; HAS: alternating or simultaneous fashion between physical and autoscopic body; modified from Blanke [7]).
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intermediate form between AH and OBE. The individual
experiencing an HAS also has the experience of seeing a
double of himself in extrapersonal space. However, it is
difficult for the subject to decide whether he/she is disem-
bodied or not and whether the self is localized within the
physical body or in the autoscopic body [11]. In addition,
the subjects often report to see in an alternating or
simultaneous fashion from different visuo-spatial perspec-
tives (physical body, double’s body) as reported by patient
2B in Blanke et al. [11] (Fig. 1).
‘‘[The patient] has the immediate impression as if she
were seeing herself from behind herself. She felt as if she
were ‘‘standing at the foot of my bed and looking down at
myself.’’ Yet, [. . .], the patient also has the impression to
‘‘see’’ from her physical [or bodily] visuo-spatial perspec-
tive, which looked at the wall immediately in front of her.
Asked at which of these two positions she thinks herself to
be, she answered that ‘‘I am at both positions at the same
time’’.To summarize, the three forms of AP differ with respect
to the three phenomenological characteristics of disem-
bodiment, perspective, and autoscopy. Whereas there is no
disembodiment in AH and always disembodiment in
OBEs, subjects with HAS generally do not report clear
disembodiment, but are often unable to localize their self.
Thus, in some patients with HAS the self is localized
either in the physical body, or in the autoscopic body, and
sometimes even at multiple positions. Accordingly, the
visuo-spatial perspective is body-centered in AH, extra-
corporal in OBE, and at an extracorporal and body-
centered position in HAS. The impression of seeing one’s
own body is present in all AP (for further details see
[11,22]. Only during AH does the subject immediately
realize the hallucinatory nature of the experience, whereas
HAS and OBEs are generally described as highly realistic
experiences [20,11,18].2.2. Multisensory manifestations and mechanisms
Although, most of the aforementioned authors agree that
AP relate to a paroxysmal pathology of own body perception
and/or corporeal awareness, it is not known which of the
many involved senses are primarily involved in the gen-
eration of AP and whether there are differences between the
different forms of AP. Some authors postulated a dysfunction
of visual processing [40,76]. Visual theories considered AP
to be visual or ‘‘specular’’ hallucinations based on the fact
that they were experienced and described by most patients
spontaneously as visual manifestations [40,76]. In addition,
especially AH, may sometimes be lateralized in the visual
field and are frequently experienced as visual pseudohalluci-
nations [22,11,18]. However, a number of arguments show
that a purely visual explanation cannot account for AP in
general. First, although all three forms of AP are described
spontaneously as visual, they are frequently experienced as
veridical (especially HAS and OBE) and not as pseudohallu-
cinations [11,22,50,73,74]. Secondly, patients and healthy
people reported that the impression of reality and self-
recognition is preserved even if visual details of the
autoscopic body during the AP differ from the patient’s
actual appearance (such as cloths, age, hair cut, size, coloring
of the body ([28,45,54,59,62,67,93]; for discussion see [11]).
In some patients, self recognition may even be immediate if
the patient only sees his back during the AP [11,32].
These data point to the importance of non-visual, body-
related, mechanisms in AP, such as proprioceptive and/or
kinaesthetic processing as already argued by Sollier [93]; for
later discussions see also: [11,22,73,62]. In line with
phenomenological differences, these authors proposed that
the involvement of disturbed processing may differ between
the different forms of AP. Sollier [93] for instance differ-
entiated HAS (or ‘‘autoscopie dissemblable’’) from AH (or
‘‘autoscopie spe´culaire’’) of previous authors such as Fe´re´
[40] suggesting that both AP might relate to different
cerebral mechanisms. He postulated the latter to be a mere
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proprioceptive-kinaesthetic disturbance associated with a
strong psychological affinity between physical and auto-
scopic body. For proprioceptive-kinaesthetic processing he
coined the term ce´nesthesia (as the body’s visceral and deep
sensations) stating that AH and HAS are due to different
degrees of the ‘‘projection of the body’s visceral and deep
sensations in the space on the outside of the body’’ [93,
pp. 34–44]. Several authors have also highlighted the role of
proprioception and kinesthesia in AP by noting that some
patients report about shared movements between their
physical and autoscopic body (autoscopic echopraxia
[22,50,67,73,62]). A further argument in favor of tactile
and proprioceptive mechanisms in AP was given by Blanke
et al. [11] who reported that the body position of the patient
prior to AH/HAS (upright) and OBE (supine) differs
suggesting a differential influence of proprioceptive and
tactile processing on AP.
Another sensory system, which has been linked to AP, is
the vestibular system that conveys sensations of the body’s
orientation in three-dimensional space to the brain. Whereas
Bonnier [14] and Skworzoff [92] noted the frequent
association of vestibular sensations of either peripheral or
central origin with AP, others proposed that a paroxysmal
central vestibular dysfunction might be an important
mechanism for the actual generation of AP [47,22,73,74].
Menninger-Lerchenthal [73] extended this view and pointed
to the importance of vestibular disorders in the generation of
visual illusions, visual dysfunctions, as well as AP. Blanke et
al. [11] suggested, on clinical grounds, a differential
implication of vestibular processing in the different forms
of AP. These authors suggested systematic differences in the
strength of a vestibular dysfunction in AH, HAS, and OBEs.
The role of the vestibular system for AP is also supported by
descriptions of vestibular sensations during AP in healthy
populations (i.e. [4,28,45,54,75,101]. Blanke et al. [11]
suggested that OBEs were associated with a gravitational,
otholithic, vestibular disturbance, whereas the vestibular
dysfunction in patients with HAS was more variable and
often characterized by rotational components, and vestibular
dysfunction was absent in patients with AS.
Finally, many patients with AP also experience parox-
ysmal visual body-part illusions [31,35,50,62,66,53,73]
and this has led several authors to argue for a similar or
closely related functional and anatomical origin of visual
body part illusions and visual illusions of the entire body
[22,62,50,53,73,74].
2.3. Etiological and anatomical mechanisms
In comparison with the rich phenomenology of the
abovementioned studies, much less information is available
about the etiology and especially anatomy of AP, which is
partly due to the fact that many cases were reported in the
first half of the 20th century. With respect to etiology, AP
have been reported in various focal and generalized diseasesof the central nervous system. Generalized neurological
etiologies include cerebral infections such as meningitis and
encephalitis, intoxications, as well as generalized epilepsies
[11,22,23,32,31,50,67,62,73]. AP following focal brain
damage also emerge from a large variety of etiologies
including focal epilepsy [32], traumatic brain damage [96],
and migraine [64] as well as vascular brain damage [59] and
neoplasia [96].
Regarding their underlying anatomy, AP of focal origin
primarily implicate posterior brain regions and with respect
to lobar anatomy most studies found the temporal, parietal,
or occipital lobe to be involved [8,22,32,50,66,96]. Some of
these authors have either suggested a predominance of
temporal lobe involvement [32,47], a predominance of
parietal lobe involvement [50,73,74], or no brain local-
ization at all [63]. Menninger-Lerchenthal [73] even
speculated on different anatomical substrates for the differ-
ent AP-phenomena, suggesting that AH originate at the
junction of the parietal and occipital lobe (junction of
Brodmann’s areas 21 and 40), HAS from the angular and
supramarginal gyrus (Brodmann’s areas 40 and 41), and
OBEs from the superior parietal lobule (Brodmann’s area 7).
These anatomical dissociations have been partly confirmed
by Blanke et al. [11] showing that AP might be related to
damage to the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). Unfortu-
nately, the number of analyzed patients in this latter study
(n = 6) did not allow performance of lesion analysis for each
of the three forms of AP. Finally, with regard to predominant
hemispheric involvement the reported data are quite
divergent. Some authors found no hemispheric predomi-
nance for AP [31,32,50,41], while others have suggested a
right hemispheric predominance for AP [22,47,73,74].
In conclusion, there is to date no comprehensive review
of AP of neurological origin that systematically analyses the
phenomenological, neurological, and anatomical findings of
each reported patient, whose AP were due to focal brain
damage. In addition, previous systematic reviews did not
differentiate between AH, HAS, and OBE [32] or only
analyzed AH and HAS [31]. In both reports, many cases of
psychiatric origin (as done by earlier authors: [50,63]) were
included, for which neurological or anatomical information
was not available. The aim of the present review is the
extension of a systematic approach used by Blanke et al.
[11] to a larger number of confirmed neurological cases with
OBEs, HAS, and AS by systematically analyzing reported
medical AP-cases from the English, German, French, and
Italian literature. In the following section we will describe
inclusion and exclusion criteria as well as critical phenom-
enological and clinical variables that we used for a statistical
comparison between the three AP. In brief, these variables
included sensory hallucinations (visual, auditory, tactile,
vestibular), illusory body schema disturbances, visual
characteristics of the autoscopic body (lateralization, view,
partialness, body position, actions), more complex manifes-
tations (sharing of thoughts, words, or actions, bilocation,
emotions) as well as associated neurological signs (hemi-
Table 1
Included cases
OBE HAS AH
O. Blanke, C. Mohr / Brain Research Reviews 50 (2005) 184–199 189anopia, aphasia, sensorimotor hemisyndrome), diagnosis,
etiology, and neuroanatomical data (hemispheric and lobar
localization of brain damage).Daly (1958, #5) [29] Hoff (1931) [52] Noue¨t (1923) [78]
Lunn (1970, #1) [66] Williams
(1956, #24) [100]
Van Bogaert (1934) [97]
Devinsky et al.
(1989, #1) [32]
Penfield and Perot
(1963, #42) [83]
Genner (1947) [44]
Devinsky et al.
(1989, #2) [32]
Ionasescu
(1960, #7) [53]
He´caen and Ajuriaguerra
(1952, #84) [50]
Devinsky et al.
(1989, #6) [32]
Lunn (1970, #2) [66] Dewhurst and Pearson
(1955, #2) [33]
Devinsky et al.
(1989, #3) [32]
Devinsky et al.,
(1989, #9) [32]
Dewhurst and Pearson
(1955, #3) [33]
Devinsky et al.,
(1989, #10) [32]
Brugger et al.
(1994) [20]
Vizioli and Liberati
(1964) [98]
Blanke et al.
(2003, #1) [10]
Blanke et al.
(2003, #2b) [10]
Ionasescu
(1960, #8) [53]
Blanke et al.
(2003, #2a) [10]
Blanke et al.
(2003, #5) [10]
Lunn (1970, #3) [66]
Blanke et al.
(2003, #3) [10]
Brugger et al.
(in press) [19]
Maximov (1973) [70]
Maillard et al.
(2004, #1) [69]
Lance (1976, #1) [60]
Salati et al. (1983) [88]
Ko¨lmel (1985, #6) [59]
Bhaskaran et al.
(1990) [3]
Dening and Berrios
(1994, #3) [31]
Blanke et al.
(2003, #6) [10]
Maillard et al.
(2004, #1) [69]
Maillard et al.
(2004, #2) [69]
Maillard et al.
(2004, #3) [69]
Zamboni et al.
(in press) [104]
The table shows all 41 published patients with either autoscopic
hallucinations (n = 20), heautoscopy (n = 10), or an out-of-body experience
(n = 11) due to circumscribed brain damage that were included and
analyzed in the present study.3. Methods
3.1. Included cases
We found 113 cases with either AH, HAS, or OBE in the
medical literature. From this sample, we included cases with
focally circumscribed brain lesions as confirmed by mag-
netic resonance imaging (MRI), computer tomogram (CT),
electroencephalogram (EEG), neurosurgical operation, or
neuropathological examination. For subsequent statistical
analysis, we kept patients, for whom classification as AH,
HAS, or OBE were possible from phenomenonological
description that was available [11,22]. For instance, we
excluded many previously reported cases, who were actually
not AP (see also [11,21,31]), but non-visual body schema
disturbances such as the convincing feeling that there is
another person close by without actually seeing that person.
This phenomenon has been called ‘‘leibhafte Bewusstheit’’
[56], ‘‘hallucination du compagnon’’ [62] or ‘‘feeling of a
presence’’ [10,21]). Although the visual reduplication of the
own body is critical for a case to be classified as an AP,
patients, who did not report visual reduplication, have
nevertheless been included in previous case collections of
AP (i.e. [23, #JB], [50,77,83], [63, #4], [56, #4–#7]).
The latter cases were excluded from analysis. Conse-
quently, we also excluded patients, who described
experiential phenomena such as scenic visual hallucina-
tions ([100, #2], [50, #1, #2]) or suffered from neuro-
logically or anatomically unspecified psychiatric illness
([66, #A, #B, #C, #D, #E, #F, #G], [63, #1, #2, #6, #7,
#8], [31, #1, #2], [51,57,68,71,72,79,91]). Accordingly,
we also excluded cases of AP due to migraine, hysteria,
narcolepsy, cataplexy, confuso-oniric states, or of hypn-
agogic origin as well as AP-cases of non-focal or
generalized neurological origin ([50, #78], [32, #3, #5,
#7]). A further case of subcortical origin has also been
excluded [26]. Two reported cases by Penfield were also
excluded due to lack of phenomenological detail [81,82].
3.2. Analyzed variables and statistical analysis
According to these inclusion and exclusion criteria, we
retained 41 of the 113 reviewed cases, of whom 11 were
OBE-patients, 10 HAS-patients, and 20 AS-patients (Table
1). Each of these 41 cases was evaluated by means of a
standard protocol including information about the following
AP-variables.
3.2.1. Hallucinations
Presence of visual, vestibular, auditory, or tactile
hallucinations (present, not present).3.2.2. Body schema disturbances
The patient noted illusory body modifications such as
smaller or larger than usual body parts, displaced or
unusual limb positions, limb disconnection, absence of a
limb, phantom limbs or supernumerary phantom limbs
(present, not present).
3.2.3. Associated neurological signs
We searched for the presence of 1) hemianopia, 2)
aphasia, and 3) sensorimotor hemisyndrome (present,
not present).
3.2.4. Lateralization
We analyzed whether the autoscopic body was seen in
the central visual field (VF) or lateralized to either the right
or left VF (lateralized VF, central VF).
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We noted whether the patient saw only certain parts of
the autoscopic body or the entire autoscopic body. We
evaluated whether trunk, extremities, neck, and head were
seen (partial, whole).
3.2.6. Position of the autoscopic body
We noted whether the autoscopic body was in upright
(standing or sitting) or supine body position. Note that
some patients experienced different body positions of the
autoscopic body. Thus, when a patient reported that the
AP included both a standing and a lying position, one
point was allocated for both criteria.
3.2.7. Position of the physical body
We noted whether the patient’s physical body was in
upright (standing or sitting) or supine body position. In
some patients the AP could occur in several different
physical body positions. Thus, when the AP only occurred
in one body position one point was allocated, when the AP
occurred in both the upright and lying position, one point
was allocated to both criteria.
3.2.8. View
We analyzed whether the autoscopic body was seen in
front-view (as facing the patient), or either in back-view or
in side-view (front-view, non-front-view).
3.2.9. Actions
Activities of the autoscopic body were noted such as
whether the autoscopic body was moving, or was acting,
i.e. running, walking, or jumping (acting, non-acting).
3.2.10. Sharing of thoughts, words, actions
We searched for more complex forms of interactions
between physical and autoscopic body. For instance,
whether the patient (1) experienced to have access to
or knowledge of the autoscopic body’s thoughts or
vice versa (here called sharing of thoughts), (2) and
whether the autoscopic body communicated verbally
with the patient (here called sharing of words), (3) or
whether the autoscopic body’s actions mimicked the
patient’s body or actions or vice versa (here called
autoscopic echopraxia or sharing of action), (sharing,
non-sharing).
3.2.11. Bilocation
We noted whether the patient had the impression of being
at two or more locations at the same time or in rapid
alternation during the AP (present, non-present).
3.2.12. Emotions
We analyzed the presence of emotions during the AP
(positive or neutral, negative). We noted that emotions
could change during a single AP allocating in these
instances more than one emotion.3.2.13. Reality
We noted whether the AP was experienced as real or not
(real, non-real).
3.2.14. Diagnosis
The diagnosis of the AP was noted.
3.2.15. Etiology
The etiology of the AP was noted.
3.2.16. Lesion side
We analyzed patients with unilateral lesions, i.e., for
whom the lesion could either be located to the left or
right hemisphere (right hemisphere, left hemisphere)
(present, not present). Patients with bilateral lesions were
excluded for the analysis of this variable.
3.2.17. Lesion site
Localization of the lesion to the temporal, parietal,
occipital, or frontal lobe (temporal, parietal, occipital,
frontal) was marked. Note that patients with a temporo-
parietal lesion, for instance, were allotted to both the
temporal and parietal group (present, not present).
3.3. Statistical analysis
It was not possible to determine each variable in all
patients. Accordingly, we included for the statistical analysis
of each variable only the number of patients, for whom
sufficient information for that variable was provided. Con-
sequently, the total number of cases for each variable varied
with respect to the grand total number of cases that were
included for AH (20), HAS (10), and OBE (11; see Table 2).
To account for systematic differences between the three
AP groups, we performed frequency comparisons (see also
[31]) using Yates’ corrected Chi-Square tests. This proce-
dure is an improved approximation of the Chi-square
statistic in small frequency tables. It reduces the absolute
value of differences between expected and observed
frequencies by 0.5 before squaring. This correction, which
makes the estimation more conservative, is usually applied
when the table contains only small observed frequencies, so
that some expected frequencies become less than 10, as is
the case in the present study. Moreover, the present study
aims to elucidate testable hypothesis about AP, in particular
regarding the distinction between the three AP groups, thus,
we did not use Bonferroni-corrections given its exploratory
nature, but by searching for important features, which could
be tested in future studies.4. Results
Frequencies and percentages of analyzed patients regard-
ing the different variables are presented in Table 2. The
number of patients with respect to the total patient
Table 2
Results of the statistical analysis
AS HAS OBE Yates(chi-square) P-value
Visual hall. (yes) 14/20 (70.0) 3/10 (30.0) 3/11 (27.3) 7.27 0.03
Vestib hall. (yes) 4/20 (20.0) 6/10 (60.0) 6/11 (54.6) 6.21 0.04
Audit hall. (yes) 1/20 (5.0) 2/10 (20.0) 6/11 (54.6) 10.05 0.007
Tact hall. (yes) 4/20 (20.0) 2/10 (20.0) 1/11 (9.1) 0.75 0.69
Body schema (yes) 2/20 (10.0) 4/10 (40.0) 5/11 (45.5) 6.07 0.048
Hemianopia (yes) 11/20 (55.0) 1/10 (10.0) 0/11 (0.0) 15.04 0.0004
Hemi-syndrome (yes) 6/20 (30.0) 4/10 (40.0) 1/11 (9.1) 3.09 0.21
Aphasia (yes) 3/20 (15.0) 3/10 (30.0) 1/11 (9.1) 1.65 0.44
Lateralization (yes) 10/20 (50.0) 3/9 (33.3) 1/10 (10.0) 5.24 0.07
Partial (yes) 9/18 (50.0) 2/10 (20.0) 2/11 (18.2) 4.26 0.12
Autoscopic body-standing/sitting (yes) 14/15 (93.3) 8/9 (88.9) 3/9 (33.3) 11.47 0.003
Autoscopic body-lying (yes) 3/15 (20.0) 2/9 (22.2) 8/9 (88.9) 13.43 0.001
Physical body-standing/sitting (yes) 7/8 (87.5) 7/8 (87.5) 3/7 (42.9) 4.79 0.09
Physical body-lying (yes) 3/8 (37.5) 3/8 (37.5) 6/7 (85.7) 4.93 0.09
View (front) 20/20 (100) 1/9 (11.1) 9/10 (90.0) 29.36 <0.0001
Action (yes) 5/17 (29.4) 8/10 (80.0) 1/9 (11.1) 11.23 0.004
Sharing (yes) 3/14 (21.4) 5/7 (71.4) 1/9 (11.1) 7.45 0.02
Bilocation (yes) 0/20 (0.0) 5/10 (50.0) 0/11 (0.0) 16.54 0.0003
Emotion-pos./neut. (yes) 4/9 (44.4) 1/9 (11.1) 5/10 (50.0) 3.99 0.14
Emotion-neg. (yes) 7/9 (77.8) 9/9 (100.0) 9/10 (90.0) 3.03 0.22
Reality (yes) 3/15 (20.0) 8/8 (100.0) 10/10 (100.0) 28.25 <0.0001
Left hemisphere (yes) 5/19 (26.3) 6/9 (66.7) 2/9 (22.2) 5.08 0.08
Right hemisphere (yes) 11/19 (57.9) 3/9 (33.3) 6/9 (66.7) 2.27 0.32
Temporal lobe (yes) 11/20 (55.0) 8/10 (80.0) 9/11 (81.8) 3.26 0.19
Parietal lobe (yes) 11/20 (55.0) 5/10 (50.0) 5/11 (45.5) 0.27 0.88
Occipital lobe (yes) 12/20 (60.0) 2/10 (20.0) 2/11 (18.2) 7.49 0.02
The table summarizes the results of statistical analysis with respect to the 17 variables. The number (n/all patients) of patients per group (autoscopic
hallucinations, AH; out-of-body experience, OBE; heautoscopy, HAS) for the different variables is given. Percent values are provided in brackets. Yates’
corrected Chi-square values, as well as P-values are presented.
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In Table 2, we also provide the Yates’ corrected Chi-square
comparisons (df = 2) including p-values. Percentages of
patients are provided in brackets. The main results of
statistical analysis are described in the following section
(see Table 2 for numerical values).Fig. 2. Hallucinations associated with autoscopic phenomena. The frequency of hall
Visual, vestibular, auditory, tactile hallucinations, and body schema disturbances are
hallucinations in HAS and vestibular and auditory hallucinations in OBE. In additio4.1. Hallucinations
Tactile hallucinations are uncommon in all AP. Visual
hallucinations were comparatively frequent in AH, while
vestibular hallucinations were comparatively frequent in
HAS and OBE (Fig. 2).ucinations associated with AH (left), HAS (middle), and OBE (right) is given.
indicated. Note the predominance of visual hallucinations in AH, vestibular
n, body schema disturbances occurred frequently in HAS and OBE (see text).
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Such disturbances appear more frequent in HAS and
OBE, while they are almost absent in AH (Fig. 2).
4.3. Associated neurological signs
Whereas hemianopia was more frequent in AH, it was
absent in OBE, and rare in HAS. Sensorimotor syndromes
and aphasia were equally rare in all APs.
4.4. Lateralization
In AH, the autoscopic body tended to be more often
perceived in the lateral visual fields as compared to the HAS
and OBE.
4.5. Partialness
Although a partial autoscopic body was numerically more
frequent in AH as compared to HAS and OBE, this
difference was not significant. Thus, in either AP, the whole
body was more often perceived than only part of the body.
4.6. Position of the autoscopic body
In AH and HAS, the dominant body position was standing
or sitting if compared with OBE. For OBE, only about 30% of
the patients were in a standing or sitting position. On the other
hand, a lying position was dominantly perceived during OBE
and only rarely present in AS and HAS.
4.7. Position of the physical body
In AS and HAS, more than 80% of the patients were in a
standing or sitting position during the AP. Albeit the
comparison only reaching statistical trend level, only about
40% of OBE patients were in a standing or sitting position.
The lying position, on the other hand, appears (statistical
trend) to be more specific to OBE (more than 80% of
patients) than to AS or to HAS (less than 50% of patients).
4.8. View
The autoscopic body was always seen in the front-view
in AH and almost always in OBE, but rarely in HAS.
4.9. Actions
Activities of the autoscopic body appear to be specific to
HAS (80% of patients), rather uncommon in AH, and
almost absent in OBE.
4.10. Sharing of thoughts, words, actions
These phenomena appear to be specific for the HAS
group (71%) and were rather rare in AH and OBE.4.11. Bilocation
This experience is frequently present in HAS, but never
in AH and OBE.
4.12. Emotions
Negative emotions are frequent during all AP. Positive
and neutral emotional experiences were especially rare in
HAS.
4.13. Reality
Whereas OBE and HAS are experienced as highly
realistic, AH are experienced as relatively unreal.
4.14. Diagnosis
The main diagnosis for all three forms of AP was
epileptic seizure; 14 of 20 patients in AS (70%), 8 of 10
patients in HAS (80%), and 9 of 11 patients in OBE (82%).
4.15. Etiology
Etiologies varied and included idiopathic epilepsy,
posttraumatic epilepsy, vascular stroke, neoplasia, dysem-
bryoblastic neuroepithelial tumor, and arteriovenous mal-
formation without any etiology being overrepresented in
any of the types of AP.
4.16. Lesion side
The comparisons for the left hemisphere reached
statistical trend level suggesting that left hemisphere lesions
are relatively common in HAS (>50%), but not in AH or
OBE. The comparison for the right hemisphere was not
significant (however, when the numerical values are
considered, it appears that right hemisphere lesions are
more common in AS and OBE; Fig. 3).
4.17. Lesion site
Temporal lesions were present in 55–82% of the
patients, while parietal lesions were somewhat less frequent
(in approximately 50% of the patients in each group).
Occipital lesions, on the other hand, were more common in
AH (60%) and relatively uncommon in both HAS and OBE
(Fig. 3).5. Discussion
Our findings show that OBE, HAS, and AH are
characterized by different patterns of associated hallucina-
tions and neurological deficits. Vestibular hallucinations and
body schema disturbances, as well as the absence of
Fig. 3. Anatomy of autoscopic phenomena. Panel A: shows the frequency of left (black columns) and right (white columns) hemispheric brain lesions that were
observed in AH (left), HAS (middle), and OBE (right). Our analysis revealed a right hemispheric predominance in OBE-patients (66.7%) and AH-patients
(56.6%) and a left hemispheric predominance in HAS-patients (71.4%). Note that the percentages for bilateral cases are not included in this figure. Panel B:
plots the frequency of lobar involvement independent of hemisphere in AH (left), HAS (middle), and OBE (right). Percentages are given for the temporal
(black), parietal (white), and occipital lobe involvement (grey). In all three forms of AP temporal lobe involvement predominated. In AH-patients, occipital
lobe involvement was significantly more frequently (55.6% with respect to 12.5% (HAS) and 18.2% (OBE)).
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lateralized visual hallucinations and hemianopia without
vestibular hallucinations and body schema disturbances
were associated with AH. Auditory hallucinations were
mainly observed in patients with OBEs. Tactile hallucina-
tions, aphasia, and sensorimotor deficits were infrequent in
all AP. In addition, the visual hallucinations of AH-patients
were significantly lateralized to the side of hemianopia.
Based on this pattern of associated hallucinations and
neurological deficits, it is possible to differentiate the
pseudohallucinatory, mainly visual AHs from both OBE
and HAS. The present differentiations confirm earlier case
descriptions of AH as a visual or ‘‘specular’’ hallucination or
pseudohallucination [40,76]. The present analysis also
provides evidence for a vestibular and body schema
pathology not for all AP in general, but specifically for
HAS and OBEs. Although such has been suggested
previously, the patient samples from these prior reports
were small, included neurological patients without verified
brain damage, psychiatric patients, without statistical
comparisons [11,22,73,74]. Our study does have importantlimitations. The data were gathered retrospectively, from a
range of sources, with variable amounts of information. The
analysis therefore had to content with missing data. Given
the nature of the data, statistical techniques have been used
at the limits of their legitimacy.
In the following we will discuss additional characteristics
of the autoscopic body that allow to differentiate AH from
HAS and OBEs. Although, several authors have reported
that AH-, and HAS-patients often only see the autoscopic
body partially ([44,70,78]; for discussion see [18]) and that
OBE-patients generally see their entire body [4,11,52],
partialness of the autoscopic body was generally infrequent
in the present patient sample and appeared to be unrelated to
any particular form of AP. Yet, 88% of the patients who saw
the autoscopic body partially were AH- (63%) or HAS-
patients (25%). In addition, all of these latter patients
experienced seeing only the upper body of the autoscopic
body, while some OBE patients also saw their lower body
[9]. In fact, when we analyzed only the patients who saw
their body partially, 71% of the AH patients (5 out of 7),
29% of the HAS patients (2 out of 7), and none of the OBE
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partially (Chi-square = 9.98, P = 0.007). A partially seen
upper autoscopic body in these AH- and HAS-patients
included head, neck, and upper trunk. Arms were often
missing. Legs and lower trunk were always missing. With
respect to the position of the autoscopic body in the visual
field, we found that the position of the autoscopic body was
frequently lateralized to the side of visual hallucinations and
hemianopia in AH [21], whereas the autoscopic body in
HAS and OBE tended to be seen more frequently in the
central visual field (see Table 2). Our analysis thus did not
confirm earlier observations by Green [45] and Brugger et
al. [21] who observed the frequent lateralization of the
autoscopic body also for OBEs. This might be due to several
reasons. Green [45] carried out her study in healthy subjects
and we only investigated neurological patients with con-
firmed brain damage that was mostly unilateral. As Brugger
et al. [21] included psychiatric and neurological patients,
and also included neurological patients with non-focal brain
damage as well as neurological patients without confirmed
brain damage differences in patient selection might explain
the phenomenological differences between the different
studies. Another interesting phenomenological characteristic
is our observation that the autoscopic body is seen as
standing or sitting in AH and HAS, whereas it is in supine
position in OBEs [11]. This grouping tended to be also
found for the actual body position of the patient prior to the
AP suggesting that the position in which the patient
experiences seeing the autoscopic body directly reflects
the patient’s own body position prior to and during OBE,
HAS, and AH. A supine body position was also found by
Green [45] in 75% of her OBE-subjects and, interestingly,
most techniques that are used to voluntarily induce OBEs
propose that subjects use a supine and relaxed position
[4,54]. On the contrary, the mainly upright body position in
AH- and HAS-patients of the present study confirms results
by Dening and Berrios [31], who reviewed a large number
of AH- and HAS-patients. These data suggest that at least
partially due to the patient’s different body positions,
pathological proprioceptive and tactile processing and its
pathological integration with other modalities (visual and
vestibular) differ for the different forms of AP.
Whereas the above described variables allow to differ-
entiate AH from HAS and OBE, our analysis suggests that
the following five phenomenological characteristics of the
autoscopic body allow to distinguish OBE and HAS. First,
whereas OBE- and AH-patients experience to see the
autoscopic body in front-view, HAS often see the auto-
scopic body in side- or back-views. Ionacescu’s patient [53,
#7], who was a hairdresser experienced rotating around his
customer (while cutting his hair) and then saw his
autoscopic body from the side. Blanke et al.’s patient [11,
#2b] saw herself from behind as did Devinsky et al.’s patient
[32, #9]. Brugger et al. [20] describe a patient who saw the
autoscopic body in many different views. Second, this
variability of views of the autoscopic body in HAS is alsoreflected in the motor actions that the latter is experienced to
perform. Thus, HAS-patients report that the autoscopic
body walks, runs, sits down, even shouts at the patient, and
beats him with his fists (for the very vivid description of a
patient’s experience see [20]). On the contrary, the
autsocopic body during OBE and AS does not move or
act. Third, HAS is often associated with the experience of
sharing of thoughts, words, or actions (71%), which are less
frequent in OBE- (11%) and AH-patients (21%). Thus,
HAS-patients experienced to hear the autoscopic body talk
to them [20] or that both bodies communicated by thought
[11, #5]. Others stated that the autoscopic body is perform-
ing the actions they were supposed to do [32, #9] or fights
with other people that could be of potential danger to the
patient [11, #5]. Fourth, whereas the visuo-spatial perspective
was unambiguously localized and experienced as unitary by
all AH- and OBE-patients (as was used to classify both
phenomena), HAS-patients frequently experienced seeing
from several different visuo-spatial perspectives [18,11].
Thus, patients 2b, 4, and 5 of Blanke et al. [11] experienced to
see from two different physical positions as did Brugger et
al.’s patient [20]. Finally, HAS-patients frequently reported to
‘‘be split into two parts or selfs’’ or as if ‘‘I were two persons’’
[80]. Others reported that they were localized at two places at
the same time (bilocation; [11, #2b and 5]). In Brugger et al.’s
patient [20] bilocation occurred in rapid succession between
the autoscopic and physical body and Lunn’s patient [66]
describes himself (during HAS) as a ‘‘split personality’’. The
latter five variables of the autoscopic double (1, views; 2,
actions; 3, sharing of thoughts, words, or actions; 4, multiple
visuo-spatial perspectives; 5, bilocation or splitting of the
self) were all associated with HAS. Thus, although OBE and
HAS share many associated hallucinations and some aspects
of the autoscopic body, they significantly differ in these latter
five, more complex, variables suggesting that they are caused
by different central mechanisms.
With respect to lesion side, our data analysis suggests
that all three AP may be due to either right or left
hemispheric brain lesions. Yet, we also found differences
with respect to primarily involved hemisphere and brain
region. OBEs (67%) were mostly due to right hemispheric
brain damage, whereas more frequent left hemispheric brain
damage was found for HAS-patients (67%). The fact that
previous studies have analyzed the lesion location for all AP
together, might thus explain why some authors reported no
hemispheric predominance [32,31,41,50]. Our data would
point to a right hemispheric predominance for AH and OBE
as suggested only for AH by previous authors [22,47,73,74].
The predominant involvement of the left hemisphere in
HAS as found by the present data has not been suggested
previously. Regarding the lesion site of AP our data
statistically corroborate older literature [31,32,47] in finding
a high predominance of temporal lobe involvement in all
APs (55–82%; Table 2). The parietal lobe was also found
frequently and was equally often involved in all forms of AP
(45–55%; Table 2). Only AH-patients had significantly
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observation is concordant with the above described associ-
ation with visual hallucinations and hemianopia as already
suggested previously based on the fact of frequent bright
coloring of the autoscopic body in AH that contrasted with
the colorless, pale, and misty appearance of the autoscopic
body in HAS [22]. Based on this we suggest that patients
with AH might have more posterior brain damage in
occipito-parietal and occipito-temporal cortex with less
involvement of the TPJ, whereas patients with HAS and
OBE have less occipital involvement and more temporo-
parietal lesions including the TPJ (see below). To summa-
rize our anatomical findings, AH seem to primarily involve
the right temporo-occipital and right parieto-occipital
junction, whereas HAS involve the left TPJ and OBEs the
right TPJ.
5.1. Multi-sensory disintegration in body and self
processing
The present analysis allows to propose a distinct
phenomenology and anatomy for each AP. In addition,
the present data are in accordance with the proposition that
AP, at the dysfunctional level, result from multisensory
disintegration. Thus, Blanke et al. [11] proposed that AP
result from a disintegration in personal space (due to
conflicting tactil, proprioceptive, kinesthetic, and visual
information) and a second disintegration between personal
and extrapersonal space (due to conflicting visual and
vestibular information). These authors proposed that, while
disintegration in personal space was present in all three
forms of AP, differences between the different forms of AP
were mainly due to differences in strength and type of the
vestibular dysfunction. Thus, Blanke et al. [11] suggested
that OBEs were associated with a strong vestibular
disturbance, whereas HAS were associated with a moderate
and more variable vestibular disturbance and AH only by a
mild or even absent vestibular disturbance. The present
phenomenological, neurological, and anatomical analysis
confirms the importance of a vestibular dysfunction and
body schema disturbance in HAS and OBE and suggests
that a vestibular dysfunction is absent or only weakly
present in AH. Moreover, the high frequency of visual
hallucinations and of hemianopia in AH suggests that
deficient visual processing rather than vestibular processing
is the main causing factor for disintegration in personal
space and/or extrapersonal space in AH. Nevertheless, the
frequent parietal lobe involvement does not exclude a
weaker interference with vestibular processing that is not
experienced in form of abnormal vestibular sensations. This
is also in agreement with the anatomical findings in the
present study showing that AH-patients have significantly
more occipital lobe involvement as compared to HAS- or
OBE-patients.
The phenomenological differences between HAS and
OBE suggest that they rely on different neurocognitivemechanisms. These more complex phenomenological differ-
ences were found despite the highly similar sensory
hallucinations and neurological deficits that were associated
with HAS and OBE. Thus in contrast to OBEs, HAS were
associated with the presence of many different views of the
autoscopic body, many actions, the sharing of thoughts,
words, and agency, multiple visuo-spatial perspectives, and
bilocation of the self. We therefore suggest, that the
association of greater phenomenological variability of the
autoscopic body (with respect to views and actions) with the
increased frequency of shared thoughts, voices, and agency
between autoscopic and (the patient’s) physical body (i.e.
echopraxia) might be due to a greater (or more variable)
implication of abnormal kinesthetic/proprioceptive informa-
tion processing in HAS. This is contrasted in OBE by the
silent and static autoscopic body, the disembodiment, the
180- inversion and the elevated and distanced visuo-spatial
perspective of the observer (with respect to the extracorpor-
eal environment) that are probably related to vestibular
disturbances [11]. Thus, it seems to the subject with an OBE
that (1) his body position and visuo-spatial perspective is
distanced (about 2–3 meters) and rotated (by 180-) with
respect to the actual physical position (Fig. 1). In addition,
during HAS, the sharing of thoughts, voices, and agency
might make it difficult for the patient to decide where the
physical agent (‘‘the thinking, speaking, and acting person’’;
[30,43] is localized: Am I in the physical body or in the
autoscopic body?). These difficulties of the HAS-patient are
increased by two visuo-spatial perspectives that either
alternate or are simultaneously present between autoscopic
and physical body. This situation makes it almost impos-
sible for the HAS-patient to decide where the observing self
is localized and might lead to the experience of two
‘‘observing’’ selfs [11, #2B]. It might thus be argued that,
HAS is not only an experience characterized by the
reduplification of one’s body, but also by a reduplification
of one’s self. As strikingly reported by Brugger et al. [20]
the high risk of suicide during this terrifying experience
cannot be overstated as some of these HAS-patients try by
all means to reestablish their unitary self. On an affective
level of the experience, these differences between HAS and
OBEs are also reinforced by the absence of positive
emotions in HAS which are quite common in OBEs, as
well as differences in the underlying anatomy in HAS and
OBEs (see below).
5.2. Body and self processing at the temporo-parietal
junction
The above model of AP has been based on phenomeno-
logical, neurological, and anatomical findings in neuro-
logical patients with AH, HAS, and OBE. It is hoped that
these clinical findings and the above described model may
help to demystify AP and facilitate a formulation of precise
research hypotheses about the sensory and cognitive under-
pinnings. In the following section, we review neuroimaging
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aspects of processing with respect to corporeal awareness
and self consciousness and link these results to illusionary
body and self experiences such as AP.
Neuroimaging studies support the role of the TPJ in
vestibular processing, multisensory integration as well as
the perception of human bodies or body parts [8]. The core
region of the human vestibular cortex [16,39,65] is situated
at the TPJ including the posterior insula. Brain damage in
this area has been associated with graviceptive vestibular
sensations and dysfunctions [15,95]. Several neuropsycho-
logical and neuroimaging studies suggest the implication
of the TPJ and cortical areas along the intraparietal sulcus
in combining tactile, proprioceptive, and visual information
in a coordinated reference frame [17,24]. Interestingly,
Leube et al. [61] have shown that the TPJ codes
multisensory conflict or disintegration between visual and
proprioceptive information about one’s arm position. Thus,
the presence of vestibular and multisensory processing at
the lesion site in patients with HAS and OBEs is
concordant with the above proposed model of a double
disintegration at the TPJ in AP. Neuroimaging studies also
support the role of the TPJ in processes of visual
perception that can be directly linked to AP. Thus, the
TPJ was found to be involved in the perception of several
visual aspects of the human body such as the perception of
body parts [13], of the entire body (in the extrastriate body
area [1,34], and of biological motion [2,46]. Importantly,
Astafiev et al. [1] have shown that activity in the
extrastriate body area is not only modulated in a selective
fashion by pictures of human bodies or body parts, but
also by modifications of a subject’s own limb position
suggesting their role in multisensory own body perception
and integration. Moreover, mental imagery with respect to
one’s own body [5,27,55,64] has recently been shown to
activate the TPJ [12,102]. This activation was dissociated
from activation due to the mental imagery of extrapersonal
objects [12,103] and was shown to correlate with
phenomenological variables of AP such as illusory self
dislocation and visuo-spatial perspective [12]. In addition,
Blanke et al. [12] demonstrated that transcranial magnetic
stimulation over the TPJ interrupted mental imagery with
respect to one’s own body but not other objects. In
summary, these data show that in addition to processing at
the multisensory level, several areas that are implicated in
the visual and cognitive analysis of the entire body of
others and of oneself are located at the TPJ.
Finally, the TPJ has also been involved in functions of
self processing such as egocentric visuo-spatial perspective
taking, agency (the feeling of being the agent of one’s
actions and thoughts), as well as self-other distinction (the
capacity by which one distinguishes between oneself and
other conspecifics). For instance, the TPJ is the classical
lesion site in patients with visuo-spatial neglect [49], a
clinical condition, which has been shown to disturb the
patient’s egocentric spatial relationship with extrapersonalspace and visuo-spatial perspective taking. Neuroimaging
studies in healthy observers have also revealed activation
of the TPJ during egocentric visuo-spatial perspective
changes in healthy subjects [85,99]. The pathological
visuo-spatial perspectives in OBEs and HAS might thus
be related to the functional systems at the TPJ that are
involved in the constant updating and calculation of one’s
visuo-spatial perspective. Our observation that no visuo-
spatial perspective changes are reported by subjects with
AH might accordingly be due to the fact that there is less
or no TPJ involvement. Another role of the TPJ for mental
activities such as agency [25,37,38] and self-other dis-
tinction [30] was reported from neuroimaging studies.
Discussing OBEs from a philosophical point of view,
Metzinger [75] has argued that during OBEs the sense of
agency is pathological as the feeling of being the agent of
one’s actions and thoughts is not localized at the position
of the physical body, but at the location where the
disembodied self is experienced to be. The present analysis
suggests that agency is not only pathological in OBEs, but
also during HAS, whereas it is normal and body-centered
in AH. Although the capacity by which one distinguishes
between oneself and other conspecifics might be consid-
ered to be unaffected in patients with AP, we argue that
this is not the case: In AH the subject experiences seeing
from one’s habitual (first person) perspective an image of
oneself in the position of another person (as an autoscopic
body or double). In OBEs, the body of oneself is seen as if
from a position of another person’s (third person)
perspective. In HAS, subjects either alternate between or
simultaneously experience seeing their body from first-
and third person perspectives. It is important to acknowl-
edge that many other cortical areas such as prefrontal
cortex, anterior cingulate, postcentral gyrus, precuneus,
occipito-temporal junction, insula, and superior parietal
lobule [2,30,46,59,84,100] have been shown to play an
important role in self processing (as would have been
expected for such a complex phenomenon). Yet, the
confrontation of the present clinical data on AP (and thus
disorders of corporeal awareness and self consciousness)
with the reviewed neuroimaging data on body and self
processing highlights the role of the TPJ and corroborates
previous evidence that the TPJ is a key neural locus for
self processing.6. Conclusion
Based on the reviewed findings we propose a neuro-
cognitive model for each of the three forms of AP that
extends previous models [11,18]. We suggest that OBEs are
related to pathological activity patterns that are primarily
localized at the right TPJ. This would be concordant with
the frequent vestibular and body schema disturbances in
OBE-patients as well as the absence of visual hallucinations
and visual deficits. Deficits in self processing (as defined
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implication of the TPJ. Although a double is seen (as in
AH) the primary sensation of the OBE-patient is that of
being disembodied and of the self being displaced to a
position in extrapersonal space. It is from this third-person
perspective (or better alter ego perspective [18]) from which
the OBE-patient experiences to see. The fact that the
present lesion analysis suggests a predominant implication
of the right hemisphere in OBE-patients (Table 2), that third
person (as compared to first person) perspective taking in
healthy subjects activates the right more than the left TPJ
[85], and that pathological egocentric perspective taking is
also linked to the right TPJ [49] is in agreement with our
model.
With respect to HAS, we suggest that they are related
to pathological activity patterns that are primarily
localized at the left TPJ. This would account for the
frequent vestibular and body schema disturbances in
OBE-patients as well as the absence of visual hallucina-
tions and visual deficits. Deficits in self processing are
important in HAS and support the implication of the TPJ.
As in all AP a double is seen. Yet, the primary sensation
of the HAS-patients is not of seeing a double in
extrapersonal space (AH) or of being disembodied
(OBE), but of not knowing where the self is. The patient
experiences seeing from multiple visuo-spatial perspec-
tives, and often of being split into two selfs (bilocation
and reduplification of one’s self). The fact that the present
lesion analysis suggests a predominant implication of the
left hemisphere in HAS-patients (Table 2) and that first
person (as compared to third person) perspective taking in
healthy subjects activate the left more than the right TPJ
[85] is in agreement with this model. Alternatively, based
on the instable visuo-spatial perspective an instable or
variable implication of both TPJs also seems possible as
well as the additional implication of brain structures
outside the TPJ that are involved in kinesthetic, proprio-
ceptive, or motor processing. Finally, the association of
echopraxia and shared speech and thoughts in HAS-
patients may be related to similar mechanisms as
pathological agency of movements and speech in psychi-
atric subjects [6,42].
We suggest that AH relate to pathological activity
patterns distinct from the TPJ. These may be primarily
localized in the extrastriate body area [1,34] or its vicinity of
either hemisphere and thus at the occipito-temporal junc-
tion. This would account for the pseudohallucinatory visual
character of the autoscopic body in AH as well as the
associated visual hallucinations and hemianopia due to
extrastriate (or occipito-temporal) interference (Table 2).
This would also agree with the frequent lateralization of the
autoscopic body and other visual hallucinations to the
contralesional hemifield. Following this model, AH do not
primarily impair the TPJ and deficits in self processing
(agency, visuo-spatial perspective, self-other distinction) are
thus absent or only minor.Acknowledgments
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